In this paper we study a continuous time equilibrium model of limit order book (LOB) in which the liquidity dynamics follows a non-local, reflected mean-field stochastic differential equation (SDE) with evolving intensity. Generalizing the basic idea of [33], we argue that the frontier of the LOB (e.g., the best asking price) is the value function of a mean-field stochastic control problem, as the limiting version of a Bertrand-type competition among the liquidity providers. With a detailed analysis on the N -seller static Bertrand game, we formulate a continuous time limiting mean-field control problem of the representative seller. We then validate the dynamic programming principle (DPP), and show that the value function is a viscosity solution of the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. We argue that the value function can be used to obtain the equilibrium density function of the LOB, following the idea of [33] .
Introduction
With the rapid growth of electronic trading, the study of order-driven markets has become an increasingly prominent focus in quantitative finance. Indeed, in the current financial world more than half of the markets use a limit order book (LOB) mechanism to facilitate trade. There has been a large amount of literature studying LOB from various angles, combined with some associated optimization problems such as placement, liquidation, executions, etc. (see, e.g. [1] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [7] , [15] , [19] , [21] , [31] , [36] , [37] , [40] , to mention a few). Among many important structural issues of LOB, one of the focuses has been the dynamic movement of the LOB, both its frontier and its "density" (or "shape"). The latter was shown to be a determining factor of the "liquidity cost" (cf. [33] ), an important aspect that impacts the pricing of the asset. We refer to, e.g., [2, 20, 27, 33] for the study of LOB particularly concerning its shape formation.
In this paper, we try to extend dynamic model of LOB proposed in [33] in two major aspects.
The guiding idea is to specify the expected equilibrium utility function, which plays an essential role in the modeling of the shape of the LOB in that it endogenously determines both the dynamic density of the LOB and its frontier. More precisely, instead of assuming, more or less in an ad hoc manner, that the equilibrium price behaves like an "utility function", we shall consider it as the consequence of a Bertrand-type game among a large number of liquidity providers (sellers who set limit orders). Following the argument of [14] , we first study an N -seller static Bertrand game, each with a profit function involving not only the limit order price less the waiting cost, the same criterion as that in [33] , but also the average of the other sellers limit orders observed. We show that the Nash equilibrium exists in such a game. With an easy randomization argument, we can then show that, as N → ∞, the Nash equilibrium converges to an optimal strategy of a single player's optimization problem with a mean-field nature, as expected.
is rather complicated, and is expected to involve systems of nonlinear, mean-field type partial differential equations (see, e.g., [24, 28] ). We therefore consider the limiting case as the number of sellers tends to infinity, and argue that the dynamics of the total liquidity should follow a pure jump Markov process with a mean-field type intensity, and can be expressed as the solution of a pure-jump SDE with reflecting boundary conditions and mean-field type state-dependent jump intensity. We note that such SDE is itself new and therefore interesting in its own right.
We should point out that the special features of our underlying liquidity dynamics (mean-field type; state-dependent intensity; and reflecting boundary conditions) require the combined technical tools in mean-field games, McKean-Vlasov SDEs with state-dependent jump intensities, and SDEs with discontinuous paths and reflecting boundary conditions. In particular, we refer to the works [11, 12, 13, 22, 23, 30, 32, 34] (and the references cited therein) for the technical foundation of this paper. Furthermore, apart from justifying the underlying liquidity dynamics, another main task of this paper is to substantiate the corresponding stochastic control problem, including validating the dynamic programming principle (DPP) and showing that the value function is a viscosity solution to the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. This paper is organized as follows. In §2 we introduce necessary notations and preliminary concepts, and study the well-posedness of a reflected mean-field SDEs with jumps that will be essential in our study. We shall also provide an Itô's formula involving reflected mean-field SDEs with jumps for ready reference. In §3 we investigate a static Bertrand game with N sellers, and its limiting behavior as N tends to infinity. Based on the results, we then propose in §4 a continuous time mean-field type stochastic control problem for a representative seller, as the limiting version of dynamic Bertrand game when the number of sellers becomes sufficiently large. In §5 and §6 we prove the dynamic programming principle (DPP), derive the HJB equation, and show that the value function is a viscosity solution to the corresponding HJB equation. Finally, in §7 we make some concluding remarks regarding how the value function is related to the equilibrium density of the LOB, following the arguments in [33] .
Preliminaries
Throughout this paper we let (Ω, F, P) be a complete probability space on which is defined two standard Brownian motions W = {W t : t ≥ 0} and B = {B t : t ≥ 0}. Let (A, B A ) and (B, B B ) be two measurable spaces. We assume that there are two Poisson random measures For simplicity, throughout this paper we assume that both ν s and ν b are finite, that is, ν s (A), ν b (B) < ∞, and we assume the Brownian motions and Poisson random measures are mutually independent. We note that for any A ∈ B(A × R + ) and
Here F N s ,N b denotes the filtration generated by N s and N b .
For a generic Euclidean space E and for T > 0, we denote C([0, T ]; E) and D([0, T ]; E) to be the spaces of continuous and càdlàg functions, respectively. We endow both spaces with "supnorms", so that both of them are complete metric spaces. Next, for p ≥ 1 we denote L p (F; E) to be the space of all E-valued F-measurable random variable ξ defined on the probability space
We often use the notations L p (F; C([0, T ]; E)) and L p (F; D([0, T ]; E)) when we need to specify the path properties for elements in L p F ([0, T ]; E). For p ≥ 1 we denote by P p (E) the space of probability measures µ on (E, B(E)) with finite p-th moment, i.e. µ p p := E |x| p µ(dx) < ∞. Clearly, for ξ ∈ L p (F; E), the law L(ξ) = P ξ := P • ξ −1 ∈ P p (E). We endow P p (E) with the following p-Wasserstein metric:
Furthermore, we suppose that there is a sub-σ-algebra G ⊂ F such that (i) the Brownian motion W and Poisson random measures N s , N b are independent of G; and (ii) G is "rich enough" in the sense that for every µ ∈ P 2 (R), there is a random variable ξ ∈ L 2 (G; E) such that µ = P ξ .
, be the filtration generated by W , B, N s , N b , and G, augmented by all the P-null sets so that it satisfies the usual hypotheses (cf. [39] ).
The following notation of "differentiability" with respect to probability measures is based on the lecture notes [11] following the course at Collége de France by P. L. Lions.For a function
Clearly f ♯ depends only on the law of ξ ∈ L 2 (F; R), and is independent of the choice of the representative ξ. We say that f :
In other words, there exists a continuous linear functional Df ♯ (ξ 0 ) :
, and refer to it as the Fréchet derivative of f at µ 0 in the direction η. By Riesz' Representation Theorem, there exists a unique random variable
. It was shown in [11, Lemma 3.2 ] that there exists a Borel function h[µ 0 ] : R → R, which depends only on the law µ 0 = P ξ 0 but not on the particular choice of the representative ξ 0 , such that ζ = h[µ 0 ](ξ 0 ), P-a.s..
We shall denote ∂ µ f (P ξ 0 , y) h[µ 0 ](y), y ∈ R and refer to it the derivative of f :
In other words, we have the following identities:
and (2.2) can be rewritten as 4) and
uniquely determined.
Let us introduce two spaces that are useful for our analysis later. We denote C 1,1 b (P 2 (R)) the space of all differentiable functions f : P 2 (R) → R such that ∂ µ f exists, and is bounded and Lipschitz continuous. That is, for some constant C > 0, it holds
Note that if f ∈ C 1,1 b (P 2 (R)), then for fixed y ∈ R, we can discuss the differentiability of the derivative function ∂ µ f (·, y) : P 2 (R) → R. In particular, if ∂ µ f (·, y) ∈ C 1,1 b (P 2 (R)) again, then for every y ∈ R, we can define
: R → R is differentiable for every µ ∈ P 2 (R), and its derivative ∂ y ∂ µ f :
Mean-field SDEs with reflecting boundary conditions
In this subsection we consider the following (discontinuous) SDE with reflection: for t ∈ [0, T ),
where θ, λ, b, σ are measurable functions defined on appropriate subspaces of [0, T ] × Ω × R × P 2 (R) × R, β is an F-adapted process with càdlàg paths, and K is a "reflecting process", that is, it is an F-adapted, non-decreasing, càdlàg process, so that (i) X s ≥ 0, P-a.s.;
(ii) T 0 1 {Xr >0} dK c r = 0, P-a.s. (K c denotes the continuous part of K); and
We call SDE (2.6) a mean-field SDE with discontinuous paths and reflections (MFSDEDR), and we denote the solution by (X t,x , K t,x ), although the superscript is often omitted when context is clear. If b, σ = 0 and β is pure jump, then the solution (X, K) becomes pure jump as well (i.e., dK c ≡ 0). We note that the main feature of this SDE is that the jump intensity λ(· · · ) of the solution X is "state-dependent" with mean-field nature. Its well-posedness thus requires some attention since, to the best of our knowledge, it has not been studied in the literature.
We shall make use of the following Standing Assumptions.
and continuous in (t, x), and satisfy the following conditions, respectively:
(i) For fixed µ ∈ P 2 (R) and x, z ∈ R, the mappings (t, ω) → θ(t, ω, x, µ, z), (b, σ)(t, ω, x, µ) are F-predictable;
(ii) For fixed µ ∈ P 2 (R), (t, z) ∈ [0, T ] × R, and P-a.e ω ∈ Ω, the functions λ(t, ·, µ),
σ(t, ω, x, ·), θ(t, ω, x, ·, z) ∈ C 1,1 b (P 2 (R)); (iv) There exists L > 0, such that for P-a.e. ω ∈ Ω, it holds that are stronger than necessary, only to simplify the arguments. More general (but standard) assumptions using, e.g., the L 2 -integrability with respect to the Lévy measure ν (even in the case when ν(R) = ∞) are easily extendable without substantial difficulties. We prefer not to pursue such generality since this is not the main purpose of the paper.
(ii) Throughout this paper, unless specified, we shall denote C > 0 to be a generic constant depending only on T , ν(R), and bounds in Assumption 2.1. Furthermore, we shall allow it to vary from line to line.
It is well-known that (see, e.g., [10] ), as a mean-field SDE, the solution to (2.6) may not satisfy the so-called "flow property", in the sense that X t,
It is also noted in [10] that if we consider the following accompanying SDE of (2.6):
and then using the law P X t,ξ to consider a slight variation of (2.7): where ξ ∈ L 2 (F t ; R), then we shall argue below that the following flow property holds:
for all (x, ξ) ∈ R × L 2 (F t ; R). We should note that although both SDEs (2.7) and (2.8) resemble the original equation (2.6), the process X t,x,ξ has the full information of the solution given the initial data (x, ξ), where ξ provides the initial distribution P ξ , and x is the actual initial state.
To prove the well-posedness of SDEs (2.7) and (2.8), we first recall the so-called "Discontinuous Skorohod Problem" (DSP) (see, e.g., [17, 32] ). Let Y ∈ D([0, T ]), Y 0 ≥ 0. We say that a pair
(ii) X t ≥ 0, t ≥ 0; and (iii) K is nondecreasing, K 0 = 0, and K t = t 0 1 {X s− =0} dK s , t ≥ 0. It is well-known that the solution to DSP exists and is unique, and it can be shown (see [32] ) that the condition (iii) amounts to saying that 
Before we proceed to prove the well-posedness of (2.7) and (2.8), we note that the two SDEs can be argued separately. Moreover, while (2.7) is a mean-field (or McKean-Vlasov)-type of SDE, (2.8) is actually a standard SDE (although with state-dependent intensity) with discontinuous paths and reflection, given the law of the solution to (2.7), P X t,ξ , and it can be argued similarly but much simpler. Therefore, in what follows we shall focus only on the well-posedness of SDE (2.7). Furthermore, for simplicity we shall assume b ≡ 0, as the general case can be argued similarly without substantial difficulty.
The scheme of solving the SDE (2.7) is more or less standard (see, e.g., [32] ). We shall first consider an SDE without reflection:
. Clearly, if we can show that (2.11) is well-posed, then by simply setting X t,ξ
T ], we see that (X t,ξ , K t,ξ ) would solve SDE (2.7)(!). We should note that a technical difficulty caused by the presence of the state-dependent intensity is that the usual L 2 -norm does not work as naturally as expected, as we shall see below. We nevertheless have the following result.
T ])) to SDE (2.11). Furthermore, such solution is pathwisely unique.
Proof. Assume t = 0. For a given T 0 > 0, and y ∈ L 1 F (D([0, T 0 ])), consider a mapping T :
We shall argue that T is a contraction mapping on L 1
To see this, denote, for η ∈ D([0, T 0 ]), |η| * s := sup 0≤r≤s |η r |, and define θ s (z) := θ(s, Γ(y) s , P Γ(y)s , z),
, we denote θ i , λ i , and σ i , respectively, as before, and denote ∆ϕ := ϕ 1 − ϕ 2 , for ϕ = θ, λ, σ, and
Recalling from Remark 2.2-(ii) for the generic constant C > 0, and by Assumption 2.1-(iv), (2.10), and the definition of W 1 (·, ·) (see (2.1)), we have
Combining (2.13) and (2.14), we deduce that
Therefore, by choosing T 0 such that C(T 0 + √ T 0 ) < 1, we see that the mapping T is a contraction on L 1 (D([0, T 0 ])), which implies that (2.11) has a unique solution in L 1 F (D([0, T 0 ])). Moreover, we note that T 0 depends only on the universal constants in Assumption 2.1. We can repeat the argument for the time interval [T 0 , 2T 0 ], [2T 0 , 3T 0 ], · · · , and conclude that (2.11) has a unique solution in L 1 F (D([0, T ])) for any given T > 0. Finally, we claim that the solution Y ∈ L 2 F (D([0, T ])). Indeed, by Burkholder-Davis-Gundy's inequality and Assumption 2.1, we have
Here, in the last inequality above we used the fact that
Applying the Gronwall inequality, we obtain that E[|Y | * ,2 T ] < ∞. The proof is now complete.
Remark 2.4. (i) It is worth noting that once we solved X t,ξ , then we know P X t,ξ , and (2.8) can be viewed as a standard SDEDR with coefficientλ(s,
This guarantees the existence and uniqueness of the solution (X t,x,ξ , K t,x,ξ ) to (2.8).
(ii) The uniqueness of the solutions to (2.7) and (2.8) implies that X t,x,ξ
, then X t,x,ξ 1 and X t,x,ξ 2 are indistinguishable. So, X t,x,P ξ := X t,x,ξ , i.e. X t,x,ξ depends on ξ only through its law.
An Itô's formula
We shall now present an Itô's formula that will be frequently used in our future discussion. We note that a similar formula for mean-field SDE can be found in [10] , and the one involving jumps was given in the recent work [23] . The one presented below is a slight modification of that of [23] , taking the particular state-dependent intensity feature of the dynamics into account. Since the proof is more or less standard but quite lengthy, we refer to [35] for the details.
In what follows we let (Ω,F,P) be a copy of the probability space (Ω, F, P), and denoteẼ[·] to be the expectation underP. For any random variable ϑ defined on (Ω, F, P), we denote, when there is no danger of confusion,θ ∈ (Ω,F ,P) to be a copy of ϑ such thatPθ = P ϑ . We note that thatẼ[·] acts only on the variables of the formθ.
We first define the following classes of functions.
We are now ready to state the Itô's formula. Let V t,v be an Itô process given by
be the solutions to (2.7), (2.8) and (2.17), respectively, on
A Bertrand game among the sellers (static case)
In this section we analyze a price setting mechanism among liquidity providers (investors placing sell limit orders), which will be used as the basis for our continuous time model in the rest of the paper. Following the ideas of [14, 28, 29] , we shall consider this process of the (static) price setting as a Bertrand-type of game among the sellers, each placing a certain number of sell limit orders at a specific price, and trying to maximize her expected utility. To be more precise, we assume that sellers use the price at which they place limit orders as their strategic variable, and the number of shares submitted would be determined accordingly. Furthermore, we assume that there is a waiting cost, also as a function of the price. Intuitively, a higher price will lead to a longer execution time, hence a higher waiting cost. Thus, there is a competitive game among the sellers for better total reward. Finally, we assume that the sellers are homogeneous in the sense that they have the same subjective probability measure, so that they share the same degree of risk aversion (or uncertainty aversion).
We now give a brief description of the problem. We assume that there are N sellers, and the jth seller places limit orders at price p j = X + l j , j = 1, 2, · · · , N , where X is the mid price. Without loss of generality, we may assume X = 0. As a main element in an oligopolistic competitions (cf.
e.g., [29] ), we assume that there exists a demand function, denoted by h N i (p 1 , p 2 , · · · , p N ) for each seller i, at a given price vector p = (p 1 , p 2 , · · · , p N ) at the moment. We note that the number of shares of limit orders the seller i places in the LOB will be determined by the value of her demand function with the given price vector, hence a Bertrand game. 1 More specifically, we assume that the demand functions h N i , i = 1, 2, · · · , N , are smooth and satisfy the following properties:
We note that (3.1) amounts to saying that the number of shares each seller places is decreasing in the seller's own price and increasing in the other sellers' price. Furthermore, we shall assume that the demand functions are invariant under permutations of the other sellers' prices, in the sense that, for fixed p 1 , · · · , p N and all i, j ∈ {1, · · · , N },
It is worth noting that the combination of (3.1) and (3.2) is the following fact: if a price vector p is ordered by p 1 ≤ p 2 ≤ · · · ≤ p N , then by (3.1) and (3.2), for any i < j, it holds that
That is, the demand functions are ordered in a reversed way. Finally, for each i, we denote the price vector for "other" prices for seller i by p −i , and we assume that there is a "least favorable" 1 A Cournot game is one such that the price pi is the function of the numbers of shares q = (q1, · · · , qN ) through a demand function. The two games are often exchangeable if the demand functions are invertible (see, e.g., [29] ).
price for seller i, denoted byp i (p −i ) < ∞, in the sense that
The pricep i is often called the choke price. We note that the existence of such price, together with the monotonicity property (3.1), indicates the possibility that h N j (p) < 0, for some j and some price vector p. But, on the other hand, since the size of order placement cannot be negative, such scenario becomes unpractical. To amend this, we introduce the notion of actual demand, denoted by { h i (p)}, which we now describe.
Consider an ordered price vector p = (p 1 , · · · , p N ), with p i ≤ p j , i ≤ j, and we look at h N N (p). If h N N (p) ≥ 0, then by (3.3) we have h N i (p) ≥ 0 for all i = 1, · · · , N . In this case, we denote h i (p) = h N i (p) for all i = 1, · · · , N . If h N N (p) < 0, then we set h N (p) = 0. That is, the N -th seller does not act at all. We assume that the remaining N − 1 sellers will observe this fact and modify their strategy as if there are only N − 1 sellers. More precisely, we first choose a choke price p N so that h N N (p 1 , · · · , p N −1 , p N ) = 0, and define
and continue the game among the N − 1 sellers.
In general, for 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1, assume the (n + 1)-th demand functions {h n+1 i } n+1 i=1 are defined. If h n+1 n+1 (p 1 , · · · , p n+1 ) < 0, then other n sellers will assume (n + 1)-th seller sets a price atp n+1 with zero demand (i.e., h n+1 n+1 (p 1 , p 2 , · · · , p n ,p n+1 ) = 0), and modify their demand functions to h n i (p 1 , p 2 , · · · , p n ) := h n+1 i (p 1 , p 2 , · · · , p n ,p n+1 ), i = 1, · · · , n.
(3.5)
We can now define the "actual demand function"
is a family of demand functions. The family of "actual demand functions", denoted by { h i } N i=1 , are defined in the following steps: for a given ordered price vector p,
as in (3.5) . In particular, if there exists an n < N such that h n+1 n+1 (p 1 , p 2 , · · · , p n , p n+1 ) < 0 and h n n (p 1 , p 2 , · · · , p n ) ≥ 0, then we set
h n i (p 1 , p 2 , · · · , p n ) i = 1, · · · , n 0 i = n + 1, · · · , N ;
(3.6) (iii) if there is no such n, then h i (p) = 0 for all i = 1, · · · , N .
We note that the actual demand function will always be non-negative, but for each price vector p, the number #{i : h i (p) > 0} ≤ N , and could even be zero.
The Bertrand game and its Nash equilibrium
Besides the demand function, a key ingredient in the placement decision making process is the "waiting cost" for the time it takes for the limit order to be executed. We shall assume that each seller has her own waiting cost function c N i c N i (p 1 , p 2 , · · · , p N , Q), where Q is the total number of shares available in the LOB. Similar to the demand function, we shall assume the following assumptions for the waiting cost. (iv) Since J i (0, Q) = 0, and ∂J i (p,Q)
> 0, one can easily check that J i (p 0 i , Q) > 0. This, together with Assumption 3.1-(iv), shows that there existsp i =p i (p −i , Q) > p 0 i , such that J i (p i , Q) p i =p i = 0 (or, equivalently c N i (p 1 , · · · , p i−1 ,p i , p i+1 , · · · , p N , Q) =p i ). Furthermore, the Remark (iii) implies that J i (p i , Q) < 0 for all p i >p i (p −i , Q). In other words, any selling price higher thanp i (p −i , Q) would yield a negative profit, and therefore should be prevented.
The Bertrand game among sellers can now be formally introduced: each seller chooses its price to maximize profit in a non-cooperative manner, and their decision will be based not only on her own price, but also on the actions of all other sellers. We denote the profit of each seller by
and each seller tries to maximize her profit Π. For each fixed Q, we are looking for a Nash equilibrium price vector p * ,N (Q) = (p * ,N 1 (Q), · · · , p * ,N N (Q)). We note that in the case when h i (p * ,N ) = 0 for some i, the i-th seller will not participate in the game (with zero profit), so we shall modify the price p * ,N i (Q) c N i (p * ,N 1 , · · · , p * ,N N , Q) = c N i (p * ,N , Q), (3.8) and consider a subgame involving the N − 1 sellers, and so on. That is, for a subgame with n sellers, they solve p * ,n i = arg max p≥0 Π n i (p * ,n 1 , p * ,n 2 , · · · , p * ,n i−1 , p, p * ,n i+1 , · · · , p * ,n n , Q), i = 1, · · · , n (3.9) to get p * ,n = (p * ,n 1 , · · · , p * ,n n , c * ,n+1 n+1 , · · · , c * ,N N ). More precisely, we define a Nash Equilibrium as follows.
Definition 3.2. A vector of prices p
* = p * (Q) = (p * 1 , p * 2 , · · · , p * N ) is called a Nash equilibrium if p * i = arg max p≥c i Π i (p * 1 , p * 2 , · · · , p * i−1 , p, p * i+1 , · · · , p * N , Q),(3.
10)
and p * i = c * ,i i (p * , Q) whenever h i (p * ) = 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , N .
We assume the following on a subgame for our discussion.
Assumption 3.3. For n = 1, · · · , N , we assume that there exists a unique solution to the system of maximization problems in equation (3.9).
Remark 3.4. We observe from Definition of the Nash Equilibrium that, in equilibrium, a seller is actually participating in the Bertrand game only when her actual demand function is positive, and those with zero actual demand function will be ignored in the subsequent subgames. However, a participating seller does not necessarily have positive profit unless she sets the price higher than the waiting cost. In other words, it is possible that h i (p * ) > 0, but p * i = c i (p * , Q), so that Π i (p * , Q) = 0. We refer to such a case the boundary case, and denote the price to be c * ,b
i .
The following result details the procedure of finding the Nash equilibrium for the Bertrand competition. The idea is quite similar to that in [14] , except for the general form of the waiting cost. We sketch the proof for completeness. Moreover, the equilibrium point p * , after the modifications, should take the following form:
11)
from which we can immediately read: h i (p * ) > 0 and p * i > c * i , i = 1, · · · , k; h i (p * ) > 0 but p * i ≤ c * i , i = k + 1, · · · , n; and h i (p * ) ≤ 0, i = n + 1, · · · , N . Proof. We start with N sellers, and we shall drop the superscript N from all the notations, for simplicity. Let p * = (p * 1 , p * 2 , · · · , p * N ) be the candidate equilibrium prices (obtained by, for example, the first-order condition). By exchangeability, we can assume without loss of generality that the prices are ordered: p * 1 ≤ p * 2 ≤ · · · ≤ p * N , and so are the corresponding cost functions c * 1 ≤ c * 2 ≤ · · · ≤ c * N , where c * i = c i (p * , Q) for i = 1, · · · , N . We first compare p * ,N N and c * ,N N . Case 1. p * N > c * N . We consider the following cases: (a) If h N N (p * ) > 0, then by Definition 3.1 we have h i (p * ) = h N i (p * ) > 0, for all i, and p * = (p * 1 , p * 2 , · · · , p * N ) is an equilibrium point. (b) If h N N (p * ) ≤ 0, then in light of the definition of actual demand function (Definition 3.1), we have h N (p * ) = 0. Thus, the N -th seller will have zero profit regardless where she sets the price.
We shall require in this case that the N -th seller reduces her price to c * N , and we shall consider remaining (N − 1)-sellers' candidate equilibrium prices p * ,N −1 = (p * ,N −1 1 , · · · , p * ,N −1 N −1 ). Case 2. p * N ≤ c * N . In this case the N -th seller would have a non-positive profit at the best. Thus, she sets p * N = c * N , and quits the game, and again the problem is reduced to a subgame with (N − 1) sellers, and in Case 1-(b).
We should note that it is possible that h N N (p * ) > 0 but p * N ≤ c * N . In this case, the profit would be non-positive, and the best option for the N -th seller is still to set p * N = c * N and quit. Such a case is known as the "boundary case", and we use the notation p * N = c * ,b N to indicate this case. Repeating the same procedure for the subgames (for n = N − 1, · · · , 2), we see that eventually we will get a modified equilibrium point p * of the form (3.11), proving the proposition.
A linear mean-field case
In this subsection, we consider a special case, studied in [28] , but with the modified waiting cost functions. More precisely, we assume that there are N sellers, each with demand function
where A, B, C > 0, and B > C, andp N i = 1 N −1 N j =i p j . We note that the structure of the demand function (3.12) obviously reflects a mean-field nature, and one can easily check that it satisfies all the assumptions mentioned in the previous section. Furthermore, as was shown in [28, Proposition 2.4] , the actual demand function takes the form: for each n ∈ {1, · · · , N − 1}, h n i (p 1 , · · · , p n ) = a n − b n p i + c np n i , for i = 1, · · · , n, wherep n i = 1 n−1 n j =i p j , and the parameters (a n , b n , c n ) can be calculated recursively for n = N, · · · , 1, with a N = A, b N = B and c N = C. We note that in these works the (waiting) costs are assumed to be constant.
Let us now assume further that the waiting cost is also linear. For example, for n = 1, · · · , N ,
Note that the profit function for seller i is
An easy calculation shows that the critical point for the maximizer is
which is the optimal choice of seller i if the other sellers set prices with averagep n i = 1 n−1 n j =i p * j . Now, let us definep For the sake of argument, let us assume that the coefficients (a n , b n , c n , x n (Q), y n (Q)) converge to (a, b, c, x(Q), y(Q)) as n → ∞. Then, we see from (3.15) and (3.16 
It is worth noting that if we assume that there is a "representing seller" who randomly sets prices p = p i with equal probability 1 n , then we can randomize the profit function (3.13):
Π n (p,p) = (a n − b n p + c n ·p){p − (x n p − y n ·p)}, A similar calculation as (3.14) shows that (p * , E[p * ]) ∈ argmaxΠ(p, E[p]) will take the form
Consequently, we see that p * = a(1−x) (2b−c)(1−x)+by , as we see in (3.17) .
Remark 3.6. The analysis above indicates the following facts: (i) If we consider the sellers in a "homogeneous" way, and as the number of sellers becomes large enough, all of them will actually choose the same strategy, as if there is a "representing seller" that places the prices uniformly; (ii)
The limit of equilibrium prices actually coincides with the optimal strategy of the representing seller under a limiting profit function. These facts are quite standard in mean-field theory, and will be used as the basis for our dynamic model for the (sell) LOB in the next section.
Mean-field type liquidity dynamics in continuous time
In this section we extend the idea of Bertrand game to the continuous time setting. To begin with, we assume that the contribution of each individual seller to the LOB is measured by the "liquidity" (i.e., the number of shares of the given asset) she provides, which is the function of the selling price she chooses, hence under the "Bertrand game" framework.
A general description
We begin by assuming that there are N sellers, and denote the liquidity that the i-th seller "adds"
to the LOB at time t by Q i t . We shall assume that it is a pure jump Markov process, with the following generator: for any f ∈ C([0, T ] × R N ), and (t, q) ∈ [0, T ] × R N ,
where q ∈ R N , and q −i (y) = (q 1 , · · · , q i−1 , y, q i+1 , · · · , q N ). Furthermore, h i denotes the "demand function" for the i-th seller, and θ ∈ R k is a certain market parameter which will be specified later. Roughly speaking, (4.1) indicates that the i-th seller would act (or "jump") at stopping times {τ i j } ∞ j=1 with the waiting times τ i j+1 −τ i j having exponential distribution with intensity λ i (·), and jump size being determined by the demand function h i (· · · ). The total liquidity provided by all the sellers is then a pure jump process with the generator
We now specify the functions λ i and h i further. Recalling the demand function introduced in the previous section, we assume that there are two functions λ and h, such that for each i,
x denotes the fundamental price at time t, and p i is the sell price. We shall consider p = (p 1 , · · · , p N ) as the control variable, as the Bertrand game suggests. Now, if we assume ν i = ν for all i, then we have a pure jump Markov game of mean-field-type, similar to the one considered in [6] , in which each seller adds liquidity (in terms of number of shares) dynamically as a pure jump Markov process, denoted by Q i t , t ≥ 0, with the kernel
Furthermore, in light of the static case studied in the previous section, we shall assume that the seller's instantaneous profit at time t > 0 takes the form (p i t − c i t )∆Q i t , where c i t is the "waiting cost" for i-th seller at time t. We observe that the actual submitted sell price p i can be written as p i = x + l i , where x is the "mid price" and l i is the distance from the mid price that the i-th seller chooses to set. Now let us assume that there is an invertible relationship between the selling prices p and the corresponding number of shares q, e.g., p = ϕ(q) (such a relation is often used to convert the Bertrand game to Cournot game, see, e.g., [28] ), and consider l as the control variable. We can then rewrite the functions λ and h of (4.3) in the following form:
(4.5)
To simplify the presentation, in what follows, we shall assume that λ does not depend on the control variable l i , and that all coefficients λ and h are time-homogeneous. In other words, we assume that each Q i follows a pure jump SDE studied in §2:
where Q t = (Q 1 t , · · · , Q N t ), N s is a Poission random measure on R + × R × R + , and {X t } t≥0 is the mid-price process of the underlying asset which we assume to satisfy the SDE (cf. [33] ):
where b and σ are deterministic functions satisfying some standard conditions. We shall assume that the i-th seller is aiming at maximizing the expected total accumulated profit:
We remark that in (4.8) the time horizon is allowed to be infinity, which can be easily converted to finite horizon by setting h(X t , · · · ) = 0 for t ≥ T , for a given time horizon T > 0, which we do not want to specify at this point. Instead, our focus will be mainly on the limiting behavior of the equilibrium when N → ∞. In fact, given the "symmetric" nature of the problem (i.e., all seller's having the same λ and h), as well as the results in the previous section, we envision a "representing seller" in a limiting mean-field type control problem whose optimal strategy coincides with the limit of N -seller Nash equilibrium as N → ∞, just as the well-known continuous diffusion cases (see, e.g., [30] and [10, 13] ). We should note such a result for pure jump cases has been substantiated in a recent work [6] , in which it was shown that, under reasonable conditions, in the limit the total liquidity Q t = N i=1 Q i t will converge to a pure jump Markovian process with a mean-field type generator. Based on this result, as well as the individual optimization problem (4.6) and (4.8), it is reasonable to consider the following (limiting) mean-filed-type pure-jump stochastic control problem for a representing seller, whose total liquidity has a dynamics that can be characterized by the following mean-field type pure-jump SDE:
where λ(Q, P Q ) := λ(Q, E[ϕ(Q)]) by a slight abuse of notation, and with the cost functional:
(4.10)
Problem formulation
With the general description in mind, we now give the formulation of our problem. First, we note that the liquidity of the limit order book will not only be affected by the liquidity providers (i.e., the sellers), but also by liquidity "consumer", that is, the market buy orders as well as the cancellations of sell orders (which we assume is free of charge). We shall describe its collective movement (in terms of number of shares) of all such "consumptional" orders as a compound Poisson process, denoted by β t = Nt i=1 Λ t , t ≥ 0, where {N t } is a standard Poisson process with parameter λ, and {Λ i } is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables taking values in a set B ⊆ R, with distribution ν. Without loss of generality, we assume that counting measure of β coincides with the canonical Poisson random measure N b , so that the Lévy measure is ν b = λν. In other words,
, and the total liquidity satisfies the SDE:
We remark that there are two technical issues for the dynamics (4.11). First, the presence of the buy order process β brings in the possibility that Q 0 t < 0, which should never happen in reality. We shall therefore assume that the buy order has a natural upper limit: the total available liquidity Q 0 t , that is, if we denote S β = {t : ∆β t = 0}, then for all t ∈ S β , we have Q 0 t = (Q 0 t− − ∆β t ) + . Consequently, we can assume that there exists a process K = {K t }, where K is a non-decreasing, pure jump process such that (i) S K = S β ; (ii) ∆K t := (Q t− − ∆β t ) − , t ∈ S K ; and (iii) the Q 0 -dynamics (4.11) can be written as
where K is a "reflecting process", and N s (drdzdy) is the compensated Poisson martingale measure of N s . That is, (4.12) is a (pure-jump) mean-field SDE with reflection as was studied in §2.
Now, in light of the discussion of MFSDER in §2, we shall consider the following two MFSDERs that are slightly more general than (4.12): for ξ ∈ L 2 (F t ; R), q ∈ R, and 0 ≤ s ≤ t, where l = {l s } is the control process for seller, and Q s = Q t,q,ξ s , s ≥ t, is the total liquidity of the sell-side LOB. We shall consider the following set of admissible strategies:
The objective of the seller is to solve the following mean-field stochastic control problem:
v(x, q, P ξ ) = sup where L(x, q, µ, l) := A h(x, q, l, z)c(x, q, l)λ(q, µ)ν s (dz), and U ad is defined in (4.15). Here we denote X x := X 0,x , Q q,ξ := Q 0,q,ξ .
Remark 4.1. (i) In (4.13) and (4.14), we allow a slightly more general drift function a, which in particular could be a(x, q, µ, l) = λ(q, µ) A h(x, q, l, z)ν s (dz), as is in (4.12).
(ii) In (4.16), the pricing function c(x, q, l) is a more general expression of the original form
x + l − c in (4.10), taking into account the possible dependence of the waiting cost c t on the sell position l and the total liquidity q at time t.
(iii) Compared to (4.10), we see that a discounting factor e −ρt is added to the cost functional Π(· · · ) in (4.16), reflecting its nature as the "present value".
In the rest of the paper we shall assume that the market parameters b, σ, λ, h, the pricing function c in (4.13) -(4.16), and the discounting factor ρ satisfy the following assumptions.
and c ∈ L 0 (R × R + × R + ) are bounded, and satisfy the following conditions, respectively:
(i) b and σ are uniformly Lipschitz continuous in x with Lipschitz constant L > 0;
(ii) σ(0) = 0 and b(0) ≥ 0;
(iii) λ and h satisfy Assumption 2.1;
(iv) For l ∈ R + , c(x, q, l) is Lipschitz continuous in (x, q), with Lipschitz constant L > 0;
(v) h is non-increasing, and c is non-decreasing in the variable l; 
Dynamic programming principle and HJB equation
In this section we substantiate the dynamic programming principle (DPP) for the stochastic control problem (4.13)-(4.16). We begin by examining some basic properties of the value function. Proof. We first check the Lipschitz property in x. For x, x ′ ∈ R, denote X x = X 0,x and X x ′ = X 0,x ′ as the corresponding solutions to (4.7), respectively. Denote ∆X t = X x t − X x ′ t , and ∆x = x − x ′ . Then, applying Itô's formula to |∆X t | 2 and by some standard arguments, one has Lipschitz in x, uniformly in (q, µ, l). That is, for some generic constant C > 0 which is allowed to vary from line to line, we have
Here the last inequality is due to Assumption 4.2-(vi). Consequently, we obtain
To check the Lipschitz properties for q and P ξ , we denote, for (q, 
which implies that We now turn our attention to the Dynamic Programming Principle (DPP). The argument will be very similar to that of [33] , except for some adjustments to deal with the mean-field terms.
But, by using the flow-property (2.9) we can carry out the argument without substantial difficulty.
By applying (5.6) and flow property, we have v(x, q, µ) ≥ Π(x, q, µ;l)
Since ε > 0 is arbitrary, we get v(x, q, P ξ ) ≥ṽ(x, q, P ξ ), proving (5.4).
Remark 5.2. We should note that while it is difficult to specify all the boundary conditions for the value function, the case when q = 0 is relatively clear. Note that q = 0 means there is zero liquidity for the asset, then by definition of the liquidity dynamics (4.12) we see that Q t will stay at zero until the first positive jump happens. During that period of time there would be no trade,
Furthermore, since the value function v is non-increasing in q, thanks to Proposition 5.1, and is always non-negative, we can easily see that the following boundary condition is also natural.
We shall use (5.9) and (5.10) frequently in our future discussion.
HJB equation and its viscosity solutions
In this section, we shall formally derive the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation associated to the stochastic control problem studied in the previous section, and show that the value function of the control problem is indeed a viscosity solution of the HJB equation.
To begin with, we first note that, given the DPP (5.4), as well as the boundary conditions (5.9) and (5.10), if the value function v is smooth, then by standard arguments with the help of the Itô's formula (2.18) and the fact that
it is not difficult to show that the value function should satisfy the following HJB equation:
where J l is an integro-differential operator defined by, for any φ ∈ C 2,(2,1) b
We note that in general, whether there exists smooth solutions to the HJB equation (6.1) is by no means clear. We therefore introduce the notion of viscosity solution for (6.1). To this end, for every ϕ ∈ U (x, q, µ) (resp. ϕ ∈ U (x, q, µ)).
A function v : D → R + is called a viscosity solution of (6.1) on D if it is both a viscosity subsolution and a viscosity supersolution of (6.1) on D.
Our main result of this section is the following theorem. , and µ = P ξ with ξ ∈ L 2 (F; R).
We first prove that the value function v is a subsolution to the HJB equation (6.1). We proceed by contradiction. Suppose not. Then there exist some ϕ ∈ U (Ü) and ε 0 > 0 such that ρϕ(Ǖ) − sup Now note that on the set {τ T < T } we must haveΘ τ T / ∈ DǕ ,η , thus [v − ϕ](Θ τ T ) ≤ −δ, thanks to (6.7). On the other hand, on the set {τ T = T } we haveΘ τ T =Θ T ∈ DǕ ,η , and then (6.8) implies that [v − ϕ](Θ T ) ≤ v(Ǖ) − ϕ(Θ T ) + ε. Plugging these facts in (6.9), we can easily obtain that
Here in the last inequality above we used the fact that ε/ρ − δ < 0, by definition of ε. Letting
Since l ∈ U ad is arbitrary, this contradicts the dynamic programming principle (5.4) .
The proof that v is viscosity supersolution of (6.1) is more or less standard, again with the help of Itô's formula (2.18) . We only give a sketch here.
LetǕ The proof is now complete.
A Final Remark
It is worth mentioning that the result of this paper can be connected to that of [33] in the following way. First, note that the value function v(x, q, P ξ ) in (4.16) is the discounted lifelong expected utility of a "representative seller", as the limiting case of a Bertrand-type of game for a large number of sellers. We shall thus consider the value function of the control problem for the representative seller as the "equilibrium" discounted expected utility for every seller. Moreover, as one can see in Proposition 5.1, the value function v(x, q, P ξ ) is uniformly Lipschitz continuous, non-decreasing in x, and decreasing in q. Also, by Assumption 4.2-(vii), the value function is convex in q. Consequently, we see that the value function v(x, q, P ξ ) resembles the expected utility function U (x, q) in [33] which was defined by the following properties:
(i) the mapping x → U (x, q) is non-decreasing, and ∂U (x,q) ∂q < 0, ∂ 2 U (x,q) ∂q 2 > 0;
(ii) the mapping (x, q) → U (x, q) is uniformly Lipschitz continuous.
In particular, we may identify the two functions by setting U (x, q) = v(x, q, P ξ )| ξ≡q , which amounts to saying that the equilibrium density function of a limit order book is fully described by the value function of a control problem of the representing seller's Bertrand-type game. This would enhance the notion of "endogenous dynamic equilibrium limit order book model" of [33] in a rather significant way.
